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I. INTRODUCTION
“Do you know why we’re here?”1 This was Virginia homicide Detective
David W. Allen’s first question to Jayant Kadian, who was suspected of killing his
mother.2 “Yeah,” Kadian replied, “because I stabbed my mom in the neck.”3
Immediately after that response, Detective Allen read Miranda warnings to Kadian,
who then confessed in chilling detail to the murder.4
Detective Allen’s simple question and Kadian’s surprising answer and
subsequent confession eventually led to a suppression hearing in a Virginia
courtroom.5 At the hearing, the judge suppressed the confession, relying on Missouri
v. Seibert,6 the United States Supreme Court’s recent fractured decision which
mandates suppression of some warned confessions obtained during a question-first
interrogation.7 The judge found that Detective Allen’s initial “question ‘makes no
particular sense except as an attempt to [elicit] an incriminating response.’”8 As the
judge explained, “[A]sking such a question, then giving a defendant Miranda
warnings, then asking about the incident in question makes a hash of the whole
process of giving a defendant notice of his rights.”9
1 Tom Jackson, Judge Invalidates Admission by Va. Slaying Suspect, WASH. POST, Dec. 12,
2005, at B3.
2 See id.
3 Id.
4 See id.
5 See id.
6 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
7 See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617 (plurality opinion). The terms “question-first interrogation,”
“two-step interrogation,” and “two-stage interrogation” all refer to a modern law
enforcement interrogation tactic: An officer will question the suspect in custody without
giving him Miranda warnings; then, after the suspect has admitted his guilt, the officer will
give him Miranda warnings and question him again, this time recording the statement to use
against the suspect in criminal proceedings. The only detailed record of the first
interrogation may be that of the eyewitnesses and participants. Justice Souter described
question-first interrogation tactics in Seibert. See id. at 609-11.
Not surprisingly, the Justices could not agree in Seibert upon the correct term for the
new technique. Justice Souter called it “question-first,” id. at 611-13 (plurality opinion),
Justice Breyer called it “two-stage,” id. at 617 (Breyer, J., concurring), Justice Kennedy
called it “two-step” or “two-stage,” id. at 621-22 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment),
and Justice O’Connor called it “two-step” or “two-stage,” id. at 627-28 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
8 Jackson, supra note 1.
9 Jackson, supra note 1.
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However, in many, if not most, state and federal jurisdictions across the
United States, the judge’s ruling would be reversed by an appellate court. The
hypothetical appellate court’s opinion would begin by laying out the relevant
Supreme Court cases, starting with Miranda v. Arizona10 and, perhaps, United States
v. Dickerson,11 then moving to Oregon v. Elstad12 and ending with Seibert. The
appellate court would explain that both Elstad and Seibert addressed question-first
situations, where the police asked the suspect a question or began to interrogate the
suspect before reading the suspect Miranda warnings, then later read the suspect
Miranda warnings and began asking questions again. However, in Elstad, the Court
allowed the subsequent warned confession to be admitted into evidence during the
prosecution’s case-in-chief, while in Seibert, the Court did not. As this Article
explores, distinguishing between Elstad and Seibert are complicated.
When analyzing Seibert, the hypothetical appellate court would first observe
that there was no majority opinion. Then it would discuss United States v. Marks,13
where the Court established the narrowest grounds doctrine, allowing lower courts to
identify or derive a controlling opinion or holding from within a fractured decision
by the Court. If the appellate court followed the majority approach to the Marks
analysis, the hypothetical opinion would quickly conclude that Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence was the controlling opinion.
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence only calls for excluding a postwarning
statement where the interrogator deliberately used a question-first strategy to obtain
the statement. It is the deliberateness requirement that seems to be missing in
Kadian’s case, and that is why the judge’s decision to suppress Kadian’s confession
would be reversed by the hypothetical appellate court. Several law professors
interviewed about the Kadian case confirmed the likelihood of this result.14
10 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
11 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
12 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
13 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
14 See Jackson, supra note 1. The professors agreed that Detective Allen’s question did not
have the necessary markings of deliberateness that Justice Kennedy required:
Ronald Bacigal, a criminal law professor at the
University of Richmond, said he thought Horan had "a
good shot" at getting MacKay's ruling overturned because
it didn't appear police schemed to evade the Miranda
warning and because they gave the warning moments after
Kadian's outburst.
George Washington University law professor Mary
Cheh agreed. "This was an off-hand comment," she said.
"Who knew he [Kadian] would blurt that out?"
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Nevertheless, as this Article will show, if the appellate court reversed the trial
court and allowed Kadian’s confession, it ultimately would be wrong. Under a
correct Marks narrowest grounds doctrine analysis, there is no controlling opinion in
Seibert, and, when given the choice, lower courts should address question-first
Miranda violations by applying the Seibert plurality opinion, rather than Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence. The Fifth Amendment declares that “[n]o person . . . shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,”15 and the
judiciary is the institution entrusted with the responsibility to guard that
constitutional right from state encroachment, including the threat posed by question-
first tactics.
The next part of this Article, Part II, traces the development of Miranda
jurisprudence, highlighting the four Supreme Court decisions most relevant to
question-first interrogations, Miranda, Elstad, Dickerson, and Seibert. After laying
this foundation, Part III explores the Marks narrowest grounds doctrine as applied by
the Supreme Court and lower courts, ending with a survey of lower court opinions
applying Marks to Seibert. Part IV explains why, contrary to the majority approach,
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is not the narrowest grounds in Seibert. Part IV
concludes by proposing that after Seibert, lower courts are free to decide what rule to
apply to question-first interrogations. Taking the next logical step, Part V evaluates
the four possible approaches that lower courts might take to question-first
interrogations. Part V concludes that the plurality test in the best choice. The Article
concludes by exhorting courts to reflect carefully upon the constitutional right at
stake when police obtain a confession through a question-first technique.
II. FROM MIRANDA TO SEIBERT: THE SUPREME COURT STRUGGLES WITH ITS
“CONSTITUTIONAL RULE”
Beginning with Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court has struggled to
define the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and, in particular, how to
deal with question-first interrogations. Over the following decades, the Court
created exceptions to Miranda, including Elstad, which allowed some confessions
that could be products of question-first tactics to be admitted. In Dickerson, the
Court answered the underlying question of whether Miranda warnings are
constitutionally required. Yet, the fractured decision in Seibert proves that the
But Cheh noted that "the police have to be a bit
more careful about questions that are directed toward the
investigation."
Id.
15 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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debate over the privilege’s scope is ongoing and that the Court still disagrees about
how to handle question-first interrogations.16
A. Miranda v. Arizona
Miranda is relevant to question-first interrogations on at least four levels.
First, Miranda was and is a constitutional paradox: It went far beyond the
Constitution’s text, yet proscribed concrete constitutional rules.17 In the opening
paragraph, the majority explained that it was addressing the Fifth Amendment
privilege’s relationship to evidence and procedure.18 That promise was fulfilled in
the third section of the opinion, which dictated the four Miranda warnings and
procedural rules for admitting warned confessions and excluding unwarned
confessions.19 Although the majority insisted that the “decision in no way creates a
constitutional straitjacket,” encouraging Congress and the states to find alternatives
to the warnings, this was a false assurance.20 In reality, the majority stated that
Congress and the states would have to demonstrate to the Court “procedures which
are at least as effective” as the warnings, an impossible challenge.21 Therefore, on its
face, Miranda is invincible: It claims to be replaceable but only by a rule that
provides more protection for the privilege.22
16 See Peter Bowman Rutledge & Nicole L. Angarella, An End of Term Exam: October Term
2003 at the Supreme Court of the United States, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 151, 179-80 (2004)
(“Seibert demonstrates that Miranda issues will continue to divide the Court despite the so-
called ‘détente’ announced several terms ago in Dickerson v. United States.”).
17 In his dissent, Justice Harlan criticized “the Court’s new constitutional code of rules for
confessions.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). He
later described “the Court’s asserted reliance on the Fifth Amendment . . . as a trompe
l’oiel.” Id. at 510 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
18 See id. at 439 (majority opinion) (“[W]e deal with the admissibility of statements . . . and
the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under
the Fifth Amendment . . . .”).
19 See id. at 467-79.
20 See id. at 467. The invitation was probably a political expedient by Chief Justice Warren.
21 See id.
22 This is the quality in Miranda that later frustrated Justice Scalia in Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). As he accurately observed in his dissenting opinion, “[T]he
Court has (thankfully) long since abandoned the notion that failure to comply with
Miranda’s rules is itself a violation of the Constitution.” Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 450 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). With this observation in hand, Justice Scalia painted a false dichotomy
between upholding Congress’s voluntariness test in 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and declaring Miranda
“an illegitimate exercise of [the Supreme Court’s] authority to review state-court
judgments.” Id. at 461. The third possibility, which Justice Scalia refused to acknowledge,
was that Congress could in theory enact other procedural rules, besides Section 3501, that
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Second, Miranda relied on two fundamental principles that speak to the
debate over the privilege against self-incrimination in question-first interrogations:
personal autonomy and evidentiary reliability.23 With respect to personal autonomy,
the Court placed a high value upon the individual defendant’s rights when
juxtaposed against the interests of government and society as a whole.24 With
respect to evidentiary reliability, the Court was concerned that modern interrogation
techniques made confessions less reliable in the absence of an advocate or impartial
observer.25 The Miranda Court used both the personal autonomy and evidentiary
reliability principles to justify placing a “heavy burden” on the government to
“demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege
against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.”26
Third, Miranda is relevant to question-first tactics because it is an explicitly
objective doctrine.27 Admittedly, the majority considered the state of mind of the
interrogator and the suspect.28 The first section of the opinion focused entirely on
satisfied Miranda’s threshold, thereby obviating the need for the judicially enforced
Miranda warnings.
23 These two rationales are described elsewhere as arising from a “disapproval of coerced
confessions . . . that has always been grounded [even pre-Miranda] in the confluence of twin
evils: coerced confessions can be less trustworthy than voluntary confessions and, distinct
from trustworthiness, the dignity of the individual is offended when the state tortures or
otherwise unduly coerces citizens to confess.” William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman,
Taking Miranda’s Pulse, 58 VAND. L. REV. 813, 816 (2005).
24 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460. In the part two of the majority opinion, which traces the
history of the privilege, the majority observed,
All these policies point to one overriding thought: the
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a
government–state or federal–must accord to the dignity and
integrity of its citizens. To maintain a ‘fair state-individual
balance,’ to require the government ‘to shoulder the entire load,’
to respect the inviolability of the human personality, our
accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the
government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence
against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the
cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth.
Id. (citations omitted).
25 See id. at 453, 455-56, 461, 470.
26 See id. at 475.
27 See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 624 (2004) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (agreeing
with the plurality’s “rejection of an intent-based test” and citing Miranda as support).
28 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-55 (describing modern interrogation techniques intended to
produce a confession from the suspect); id. at 468-69 (rejecting a subjective test for
knowledge of the right to remain silent).
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the many techniques law enforcement officers employed to produce a calculated
result: an admission of guilt.29 However, in the end, the majority chose an objective
rule, from the Miranda warnings to the knowing and intelligent waiver.30 In fact,
the majority emphatically rejected a subjective standard for determining whether the
defendant knew his right to remain silent.31
Finally, the Miranda majority arguably addressed question-first tactics, a
point often overlooked. When the majority described its holding, it repeatedly
declared that the warnings must be given first, before any interrogation.32 The
29 See id. at 445-58.
30 See id. at 478-79 (requiring the state to produce evidence at trial that it gave defendant the
Miranda warnings and that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his
rights).
31 The majority declared:
The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our
system of constitutional rule and the expedient of giving
an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege
so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases
whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a
warning being given. Assessments of the knowledge the
defendant possessed, based on information as to his age,
education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities,
can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut
fact.
Id. at 468-69. Besides the uncertain nature of a subjective test, the Court identified a second
reason for requiring the test to be objective, related to the reliability of the confession: “More
important, whatever the background of the person interrogated, a warning at the time of the
interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual
knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time.” Id. at 469.
Since Miranda, the Court has continued to debate the value of subjective versus
objective tests in protecting the privilege against self-incrimination. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at
624-27 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Peter B. Rutledge, Miranda and Reasonableness, 42 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1011, 1011-12 (2005). Three factors in this debate are (1) the administrability
of the rule; (2) the protection of individual rights; (3) and the balancing of interests between
the individual and law enforcement. See Rutledge, supra, at 1014-18. The subjective-
objective debate reached a high point in Seibert with Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. See id.
at 1023-24.
32 For example, the Court stated:
The principles announced today deal with the protection
which must be given to the privilege against self-
incrimination when the individual is first subjected to
police interrogation while in custody at the station or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. It is at this point that our adversary
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majority did not distinguish between the consequences for questioning first and
warning first. The Miranda majority also placed substantial value on the temporal
element of the warnings when applying its holding to the specific cases under
review.33 The Court even went so far as to treat one of the Miranda cases, Westover
v. United States,34 as a question-first interrogation.35
B. Oregon v. Elstad
Although Miranda initially appeared to be a bright-line rule, the Court has
since created many exceptions to Miranda in its struggle to define the scope of the
privilege against self-incrimination.36 The exception most directly related to
system of criminal proceedings commences,
distinguishing itself at the outset from the inquisitorial
system recognized in some countries. Under the system
of warnings we delineate today or under any other system
which may be devised and found effective, the safeguards
to be erected about the privilege must come into play at
this point.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477 (emphases added). Similarly, in the Court’s summary of its
holding, Chief Justice Warren wrote that the defendant being interrogated “must be warned
prior to any questioning.” Id. at 479 (emphasis added).
33 See id. at 492 n.67, 495-97.
34 342 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1965), rev’d, Arizona v. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
35 The Court found in Westover that, where the defendant had undergone a lengthy state
interrogation and the federal “interrogation was conducted immediately following the state
interrogation in the same police station–in the same compelling surroundings,” the “giving
of warnings alone [by the federal agents] was not sufficient to protect the privilege.” See
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 496-97. The Court noted that “[a] different case would be presented if
an accused were taken into custody by the second authority, removed both in time and place
from his original surroundings, and then adequately advised of his rights and given an
opportunity to exercise them.” See id. at 496. This dicta tracks several of the factors in the
Seibert plurality’s test. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615.
In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), Justice O’Connor dismissed the Miranda
Court’s analysis of Westover as a finding of actual coercion. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310.
After noting that Westover was decided with Miranda, Justice O’Connor wrote, “Of the
courts that have considered whether a properly warned confession must be suppressed
because it was preceded by an unwarned but clearly voluntary admission, the majority have
explicitly or implicitly recognized that Westover’s requirement of a break in the stream of
events is inapposite.” See id. at 311 & n.2. By relying on a “majority” of lower courts,
Justice O’Connor avoided confronting the Miranda Court’s analysis of the facts in Westover.
36 See Paul G. Alvarez, Comment, Taking Back Miranda: How Seibert and Patane Can Keep
“Question-First” and “Outside Miranda” Interrogation Tactics in Check, 54 CATH. U. L.
REV. 1195, 1202-12 (2004) (describing how the Supreme Court “took definitive steps
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question-first tactics is Oregon v. Elstad.37 In Elstad, the Court held that when a
suspect has made an unwarned but voluntary admission, a subsequent warned and
voluntary statement is admissible.38 As Justice O’Connor wrote for the majority,
It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold
that a simple failure to administer the warnings,
unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other
circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect’s
ability to exercise his free will, so taints the
investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary
and informed waiver is ineffective for some
indeterminate period.39
Therefore, “absent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial
statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not
warrant a presumption of compulsion.”40 Additionally, the Elstad majority felt that a
fifth Miranda warning, that the “prior statement could not be used against” the
suspect, was “neither practicable nor constitutionally necessary.”41
The Elstad majority unambiguously rejected two arguments for excluding the
second statement. It found neither the “fruit of the poisonous tree”42 nor the “let the
cat out of the bag”43 theory justified excluding the second statement. Consequently,
toward tempering the bright-line rule of Miranda” through “a series of five major cases over
the twenty years following Miranda”). The most significant Miranda exceptions include
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), Oregon
v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298 (1985), United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004), and Missouri v. Seibert,
542 U.S. 600 (2004).
37 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
38 Id. at 318.
39 Id. at 309.
40 Id. at 314.
41 Id. at 316.
42 The defendant’s first argument for suppressing the second statement was that it was a
“fruit of the poisonous tree” and should be therefore be excluded as the product of an initial
Miranda violation. Id. at 304. The Elstad majority rejected this analogy to the Fourth
Amendment context because “[t]he Miranda exclusionary rule . . . serves the Fifth
Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself.” Id. at 306.
Therefore, if the statement was warned, the only other requirement the prosecution had to
satisfy was the knowing and voluntary standard for a Miranda waiver. Id. at 309.
43 The defendant’s second argument was that the first statement “let the cat out of the bag,”
so that the suspect would face “a subtle form of lingering compulsion” when making the
second statement. Id. at 311. The Elstad majority rejected this reasoning: “[E]ndowing the
psychological effects of voluntary unwarned admissions with constitutional implications
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Elstad could have ended the question-first debate. Twenty years later, however, the
Seibert Justices disagreed about how to interpret Elstad. The Seibert plurality
interpreted Elstad as creating a good-faith mistake exception for Miranda
violations,44 while the Seibert dissent interpreted Elstad as requiring all question-first
interrogations to meet the traditional Fifth Amendment voluntariness test.45 Justice
Kennedy interpreted Elstad as adequately addressing all interrogations except for
deliberate two-step interrogations.46 Elstad contains language that supports each
position, so it is no surprise that the Court disagreed.47
C. Dickerson v. United States
Dickerson v. United States48 is central to the discussion of question-first
tactics because the Court used Dickerson to reaffirm Miranda’s constitutional nature.
In Dickerson, the Court rejected Congress’ attempt to statutorily overrule Miranda.49
The seven-justice majority, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, refused to allow
Congress to overrule Miranda and, relying on stare decisis principles, refused to
overrule Miranda itself.50
would, practically speaking, disable the police from obtaining the suspect’s informed
cooperation even when the official coercion proscribed by the Fifth Amendment played no
part in either his warned or unwarned confessions.” Id. at 311. Consequently, “[a]
subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but
unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded
admission of the earlier statement.” Id. at 314.
44 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 614-15 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“Although the Elstad
Court expressed no explicit conclusion about either officer’s state of mind, it is fair to read
Elstad as treating the living room conversation as a good-faith Miranda mistake, not only
open to correction by careful warnings before systematic questioning in that particular case,
but posing no threat to warn-first practice generally.”).
45 Id. at 628 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“I would analyze the two-step interrogation
procedure under the voluntariness standards central to the Fifth Amendment and reiterated in
Elstad.”).
46 Id. at 619 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
47 But see Joëlle Anne Moreno, Faith-Based Miranda?: Why the New Missouri v. Seibert
Police “Bad Faith” Test is a Terrible Idea, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 395, 410-13 (2005). Professor
Joëlle Anne Moreno argues that Justice Souter and Justice Kennedy both misread Elstad’s
facts and that their interpretations of the Elstad majority opinion are therefore wrong. See id.
at 410-12.
48 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
49 See id. at 443-44.
50 Id. at 444.
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The Dickerson majority reaffirmed several key Miranda doctrines. First, the
majority noted that “Miranda announced a constitutional rule.”51 The majority
reconciled this statement with the Miranda exceptions by claiming that the Miranda
exceptions “illustrate the principle–not that Miranda is not a constitutional rule–but
that no constitutional rule is immutable.”52 Second, the Dickerson majority admitted
that Miranda placed a higher cost on society because it was an objective rule. Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote: “The disadvantage of the Miranda rule is that statements
which may be by no means involuntary, made by a defendant who is aware of his
‘rights,’ may nonetheless be excluded and a guilty defendant go free as a result.”53
However, the Chief Justice believed that society could benefit from Miranda’s
objectivity because the alternative totality of the circumstances test would be harder
to administer.54
D. Missouri v. Seibert
Missouri v. Seibert55 represents the latest episode in the Court’s quest to
define the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination. In Seibert, the Court
reconsidered the constitutionality of question-first tactics in light of Elstad. The
result was a fractured decision that left lower courts with the task of finding
constitutional law somewhere within four opinions, non of which received more than
four votes.
1. The Facts
The defendant in Seibert, Patrice Seibert, had a twelve-year-old son,
Jonathan, with cerebral palsy.56 When Jonathan died in his sleep, Seibert was afraid
she would be charged with neglect because Jonathan had bedsores.57 Seibert
conspired with her other two sons and their friends to set fire to their trailer house
and burn Jonathan’s body in it; to make the plan complete, Seibert planned to leave
51 Id.
52 Id. at 441.
53 Id. at 444.
54 Id. (suggesting that an alternative totality of the circumstances test would “more difficult
for law enforcement officers to conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner.”).
55 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
56 See id. at 604 (plurality opinion).
57 See id.
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another mentally ill teenager, Donald Rector, in the trailer when they set it on fire.58
The fire was set, and Donald died in it.59
In the subsequent investigation, Seibert became a suspect; before Seibert’s
arrest, Officer Richard Hanrahan instructed the arresting officer not to read Seibert
her Miranda rights.60 At the police station, Officer Hanrahan interrogated Seibert for
about half an hour, pressuring her to admit that Seibert knew Donald would be left in
the fire.61 When Seibert admitted she knew, Officer Hanrahan gave her a break, read
her Miranda warnings, obtained a signed Miranda waiver, and then continued
questioning Seibert.62 During the second interrogation, Officer Hanrahan walked
Seibert through her earlier statement, repeating questions and even reminding her of
answers she gave in the first interrogation.63 Eventually, Seibert confessed and was
convicted.64
58 See id.
59 See id.
60 See id.
61 See id. at 605.
62 See id.
63 The plurality quoted a crucial passage from the second interrogation where Officer
Hanrahan pressed Seibert about her intent until she confessed:
Hanrahan: "And what was the understanding about
Donald?"
Seibert: "If they could get him out of the trailer, to take
him out of the trailer."
Hanrahan: "And if they couldn't?"
Seibert: "I, I never even thought about it. I just figured
they would."
Hanrahan: " 'Trice, didn't you tell me that he was
supposed to die in his sleep?"
Seibert: "If that would happen, 'cause he was on that
new medicine, you know....."
Hanrahan: "The Prozac? And it makes him sleepy. So
he was supposed to die in his sleep?"
Seibert: "Yes."
Id.
64 See id.
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2. The Plurality Opinion
Justice Souter wrote for the plurality in Seibert, joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer.65 The plurality first observed that Miranda warnings were
designed “to reduce the risk of a coerced confession and to implement the Self-
Incrimination Clause.”66 The plurality explained that “Miranda warnings are
customarily given under circumstances allowing for a real choice between talking
and remaining silent.”67 But the plurality found that law enforcement departments
were promoting question-first tactics to neutralize the effectiveness of Miranda
warnings.68 As the Miranda Court had done over thirty years earlier, the plurality
considered how the interrogation practice would affect a suspect’s knowing and
voluntary exercise (or waiver) of the privilege against self-incrimination, as
protected through the Miranda warnings.69 For the plurality, “[t]he threshold issue
when interrogators question first and warn later is thus whether it would be
reasonable to find that in these circumstances the warnings could function
‘effectively’ as Miranda requires.”70 The plurality concluded that the warnings
were likely to be ineffective.71
Once the plurality concluded that question-first tactics could make Miranda
warnings ineffective, it turned to the State of Missouri’s argument that Elstad was
65 Justice Breyer concurred “fully” in the plurality opinion, and he also wrote a separate
concurrence in which he argued for an application of the “fruit of the poisonous tree”
doctrine. See id. at 617-18 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor, in the her Seibert
dissent, wrote that “[t]he Court today [in United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004)]
refuses to apply the traditional ‘fruits’ analysis to the physical fruit of a claimed Miranda
violation. The [Seibert] plurality correctly refuses to apply a similar analysis to testimonial
fruits.” Id. at 623-24 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). This suggests that Justice Breyer was the
only vote for a traditional fruits analysis.
66 Id. at 608 (plurality opinion) (quoting Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 790 (2003)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
67 Id. at 609.
68 See id. at 611-13. Justice Souter concluded that “[t]he upshot of all this advice [given by
police departments and even a national police training organization] is a question-first
practice of some popularity, as one can see from the reported cases describing its use,
sometimes in obedience to departmental policy.” Id. at 611.
69 See id. at 612-13.
70 See id. at 611-12.
71 See id. at 613. Justice Souter explained, “By any objective measure, applied to
circumstances exemplified here, it is likely that if the interrogators employ the technique of
withholding warnings until after interrogation succeeds in eliciting a confession, the
warnings will be ineffective in preparing the suspect for successive interrogation, close in
time and similar in content.” Id. He reasoned that this was why police departments were
applying question-first techniques. See id.
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controlling.72 Justice Souter declared that Missouri’s argument “disfigures” Elstad.73
Elstad, wrote Justice Souter, created a good-faith mistake exception to Miranda,
while the facts in Seibert “by any objective measure reveal a police strategy adapted
to undermine the Miranda warnings.”74 Elstad was therefore distinguishable based
on “a series of relevant facts that bear on whether Miranda warnings delivered
midstream could be effective enough to accomplish their object.”75 These facts
turned into a five-factor test to measure the efficacy of Miranda warnings.76
2. Justice Breyer’s Concurrence
Justice Breyer wrote a brief concurrence in which he declared that he
“join[ed] the plurality’s opinion in full.”77 However, he wanted to apply the “fruit of
the poisonous tree” rationale which the Elstad majority had dismissed, and he
believed that the plurality’s approach would have that effect.78 Most importantly,
Justice Breyer endorsed the good faith exception reading of Elstad that was vital to
the plurality’s decision.79
3. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence in the Judgment and Opinion
Playing Seibert’s Lone Ranger, Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment
but wrote a separate opinion. He noted that while he agreed with “much” of the
plurality’s opinion, his “approach does differ in some respects, requiring this
separate statement.”80 Justice Kennedy based his opinion on a practical balancing of
72 See id. at 614.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 615-16.
75 Id. at 615.
76 Id. The five factors are: (1) “the completeness and detail of the questions and answers in
the first round of interrogation”; (2) “the overlapping content of the two statements”; (3) “the
timing and setting of the first and the second”; (4) “the continuity of police personnel”; (5)
“the degree to which the interrogator’s questions treated the second round as continuous with
the first.” Id. at 615. Arguably, the plurality added a sixth factor when it stated that the
absence of “a formal addendum warning that a previous statement could not be used” was
“clearly a factor that blunts the efficacy of the warnings and points to a continuing, not a
new, interrogation.” Id. at 616 & n.7. Most lower courts, however, describe the test as
comprising five factors. See, e.g., United States v. Briones, 390 F.3d 610, 613 (2005) reh’g
and reh’g en banc denied.
77 See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617-18 (Breyer, J., concurring).
78 See id.
79 See id. at 617 (“Courts should exclude the ‘fruits’ of the initial unwarned questioning
unless the failure to warn was in good faith.”) (citations omitted).
80 Id. at 619 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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the public and private interests inherent in interrogations.81 He explained that the
Miranda exceptions illustrated this interest-balancing approach: “[N]ot every
violation of the [Miranda] rule requires suppression of the evidence obtained.
Evidence is admissible where the central concerns of Miranda are not likely to be
implicated and when other objectives of the criminal justice system are best served
by its introduction.”82 Justice Kennedy identified the central concerns of Miranda as
“the general goal of deterring improper police conduct’” and “the Fifth
Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy evidence.’”83
Elstad, Justice Kennedy felt, properly balanced the interests in most two-step
interrogations.84 However, where “[t]he police used a two-step questioning
technique based on a deliberate violation of Miranda,” the balance of interests
shifted because, when applied intentionally, the technique “distorts the meaning of
Miranda” and “furthers no legitimate countervailing interest.”85 Therefore, when
police deliberately employed question-first tactics to violate Miranda, Justice
Kennedy believed that “postwarning statements that are related to the substance of
prewarning statements must be excluded absent specific, curative steps.”86
In a crucial portion of his opinion, Justice Kennedy attempted to distinguish
his approach from that of the plurality.87 He wrote that the plurality’s “test envisions
81 See id. at 619.
82 Id. at 618-19. Justice Kennedy referred to four Miranda exceptions as appropriately
balancing public and private interests: Harris, Quarles, Patane, and Elstad. See id. at 619-
20.
83 Id. at 619.
84 See id. at 620 (“Elstad reflects a balanced and pragmatic approach to enforcement of the
Miranda warning.”). Justice Kennedy quoted approvingly the following statement from
Elstad: “It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer
warnings . . . so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed
waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period.” Id. at 620 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985)).
85 Id. at 621.
86 Id. Justice Kennedy required that “[c]urative measures should be designed to ensure that a
reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would understand the import and effect of the
Miranda warning and of the Miranda waiver.” Id. at 622. He hypothesized that “a
substantial break in time and circumstances between the prewarning statement and the
Miranda warning may suffice in most circumstances, as it allows the accused to distinguish
the two contexts and appreciate that the interrogation has taken a new turn.” Id. (citations
omitted). Justice Kennedy also suggested that the fifth Miranda warning rejected by Justice
O’Connor in Elstad might be an adequate curative measure: “Alternatively, an additional
warning that explains the likely inadmissibility of the prewarning custodial statement may be
sufficient.” Id.
87 See id. at 621-22.
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an objective inquiry from the perspective of the suspect, and applies in the case of
both intentional and unintentional two-stage interrogations.”88 He said, “In my view,
this test cuts too broadly. . . . I would apply a narrower test applicable only in the
infrequent case, such as we have here, in which the two-step interrogation technique
was used in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning.”89 Justice
Kennedy envisioned Elstad as the general rule and Seibert as the exception where
“the deliberate two-step interrogation was employed.”90
5. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice O’Connor, who wrote the Elstad majority opinion, wrote the dissent
in Seibert. She applauded the plurality for not applying a “fruit of the poisonous
tree” analysis and for not focusing on the interrogator’s subjective intent.91 Much of
the dissent was devoted to explaining why Justice Kennedy’s use of subjective intent
was wrong.92 However, the dissent disagreed with the plurality about the need to
protect the defendant from coercion caused by the two-step interrogation tactic.93
Two-step interrogations should be “analyze[d] . . . under the voluntariness standards
central to the Fifth Amendment and reiterated in Elstad.”94
6. On Subjective Versus Objective Standards
Although it only earned a footnote in the plurality’s decision, the debate over
objective versus subjective standards in evaluating question-first interrogations is
central to the disagreement between the nine Seibert Justices. Justice Kennedy
unambiguously endorsed the interrogator’s deliberate violation of Miranda warnings
as the triggering element for a different constitutional inquiry, arguably a subjective
standard. The dissent, on the other hand, vehemently rejected subjective intent, so
those four Justices subscribed to an objective standard. The real question is,
therefore, where the plurality falls in the debate.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 622.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 623 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
92 See id. at 624-27.
93 See id. at 627-628. The dissent characterized the plurality’s approach as
“indistinguishable” from the “cat out of the bag” argument that the Elstad majority rejected.
Id. at 627.
94 Id. at 628.
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When the plurality distinguished Elstad as a good-faith mistake, it relied on
the officer’s intent to justify the Miranda exception.95 On the other hand, the
plurality quickly differentiated the facts in Elstad with the facts in Seibert: “At the
opposite extreme are the facts here, which by any objective measure reveal a police
strategy adapted to undermine the Miranda warnings.”96 This statement led to the
footnote which appeared to signal the plurality’s commitment to an objective rather
than subjective test: “Because the intent of the officer will rarely be as candidly
admitted as it was here (even as it is likely to determine the conduct of the
interrogation), the focus is on facts apart from intent that show the question-first
tactic at work.”97 This footnote is consistent with the plurality’s objective threshold
question, which questions the potential “effectiveness” of Miranda warnings in light
of question-first tactics, disregarding the actual or likely intent of either the
interrogator or the suspect.98
Furthermore, at the end of the opinion, Justice Souter clarified the objective
nature of the plurality’s test. The test is objective from the reasonable person
standard: “These [question-first interrogation] circumstances must be seen as
challenging the comprehensibility and efficacy of the Miranda warnings to the point
that a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes would not have understood them to
convey a message that she retained a choice about continuing to talk.”99
95 Id. at 615 (plurality opinion) (“Although the Elstad Court expressed no explicit conclusion
about either officer's state of mind, it is fair to read Elstad as treating the living room
conversation as a good-faith Miranda mistake, not only open to correction by careful
warnings before systematic questioning in that particular case, but posing no threat to warn-
first practice generally.”).
96 See id. at 616.
97 See id. at 616 n.6.
98 The plurality believed that the circumstances of the interrogation would create a situation
in which Miranda warnings would be ineffective for a person in the suspect’s shoes:
By any objective measure, applied to circumstances
exemplified here, it is likely that if the interrogators
employ the technique of withholding warnings until after
interrogation succeeds in eliciting a confession, the
warnings will be ineffective in preparing the suspect for
successive interrogation, close in time and similar in
content.
See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613.
99 See id. at 617 (note omitted).
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One commentator has questioned whether “the plurality foreclosed subjective
characteristics entirely.”100 Admittedly, the plurality did not reject a subjective
inquiry as clearly as it found such an inquiry unhelpful and unnecessary. The
objective-subjective distinction could be resolved when the Court next considers
question-first tactics. Meanwhile, lower courts attempting to understand Seibert
should accept the basic premise that the plurality’s test is objective. Otherwise, the
quandary posed by the fractured decision makes little sense. Both the plurality and
Justice Kennedy agreed that the confession should suppressed.101 But Justice
Kennedy distinguished his position from that of the plurality by characterizing the
plurality’s test as “an objective inquiry from the perspective of the suspect [that]
applies in the case of both intentional and unintentional two-stage interrogations.”102
Finally, in her dissent, Justice O’Connor praised the plurality for rejecting an intent-
based test.103
The Court will continue to debate the scope of the privilege’s suppression
remedy. However, at least until the Court’s next Miranda opinion, lower courts
must play the cards they have been dealt. This means lower courts should scrutinize
Seibert in light of the Court’s guidance on fractured decisions to determine what
binding precedent applies to question-first interrogations.
III. FROM MARKS TO SEIBERT: PLURALITY OPINIONS, CONCURRENCES, AND THE
NARROWEST GROUNDS DOCTRINE
Because Seibert has no clear majority opinion, lower courts addressing
question-first tactics must decide whether one or more of the four opinions in Seibert
100 See Peter B. Rutledge, Miranda and Reasonableness, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1011, 1024
(2005). Professor Peter B. Rutledge expressed uncertainty about the plurality’s commitment
to an objective standard:
I find support for this view [that the plurality did not “foreclose[]
subjective characteristics entirely”] in footnote six of the
plurality's opinion where it explains the ‘focus’ on facts ‘apart
from intent’ because it will be so rare for a police officer candidly
to admit his intent as the interrogation officer in Seibert did. To
me, this suggests not a wholly objective approach but one more
akin to the approach in Innis where the subjective intent of the
officer is relevant, but not essential, to the inquiry.
Id.
101 Cf. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617 (plurality opinion) with id. at 622.
102 See id. at 621 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). In other words, the objective
nature of the plurality’s test is most evident as a negative inference from Justice Kennedy’s
opinion.
103 See id. at 624 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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is, or contains, controlling precedent. For lower courts, the most popular approach to
this question is to apply the narrowest grounds doctrine. As Part III.A explains, the
Supreme Court developed the narrowest grounds doctrine in Marks v. United
States,104 a First Amendment obscenity case. However, Part III.B notes that the
Court has been inconsistent in its application of Marks, recently failing in Grutter v.
Bollinger,105 to resolve a circuit split on how Marks should be applied. Despite the
Court’s partial silence on Marks, many lower courts have applied Marks to Seibert.
As the jurisdictional survey in Part III.C shows, the majority of lower courts that
have applied a Marks analysis have concluded that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is
the controlling opinion in Seibert. However, a minority of lower courts disagree
with that analysis and offer logical alternatives.
A. United States v. Marks and the Narrowest Grounds Doctrine
The narrowest grounds doctrine arose in United States v. Marks106 as part of
the Court’s resolution of long-standing disagreements among the Justices over the
First Amendment status of obscenity.107 In Marks, the defendants were charged with
the interstate transportation of obscene materials.108 Their criminal conduct ended in
February 1973.109 In June 1973, the Court decided Miller v. California,110 finally
establishing, by majority opinion, a controlling precedent for obscenity cases,
including a new definition of obscenity.111 At trial, the defendants argued that they
104 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
105 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
106 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
107 See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 192-204 (Simon &
Schuster 1979) (describing how, in the context of the 1971 term, current and former
Supreme Court justices had disagreed strongly about the status of obscenity under the First
Amendment).
108 See Marks, 430 U.S. at 189.
109 See id.
110 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
111 See Marks, 430 at 190 & n.3. As the Marks Court detailed, Miller created a three-part
test for deciding whether material was obscene and not protected by the First Amendment:
“The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a)
whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary
community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically delineated by the applicable
state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”
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should be tried under the definition of obscenity in the 1966 plurality opinion,
Memoirs v. Massachusetts,112 which they claimed constituted the Court’s obscenity
rule before Miller.113 The district court refused to apply Memoirs and applied
Miller’s more stringent test, under which defendants were convicted.114
The Sixth Circuit heard the defendants’ appeal.115 In their decision affirming
the district court, the circuit “noted correctly that the Memoirs standards never
commanded the assent of more than three Justices at any one time, and [the court]
apparently concluded from this fact that Memoirs never became the law.”116 The
circuit reasoned that if Memoirs was not controlling, then the last opinion where a
majority of the Supreme Court agreed would be the proper rule, and because Miller
was consistent with that earlier decision, it was fair to use Miller to convict the
defendants.117
The Supreme Court reversed.118 Justice Powell wrote for the majority, “[W]e
think the basic premise for this line of reasoning is faulty.”119 He then stated the
narrowest grounds doctrine: “When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
Id. at 190 n.3 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).
112 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
113 See Marks, 430 U.S. at 190-91. The Marks Court noted,
The plurality in Memoirs held that ‘three elements must
coalesce’ if material is to be found obscene and therefore
outside the protection of the First Amendment: ‘(I)t must
be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex; (b)
the material is patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary community standards relating to the
description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the
material is utterly without redeeming social value.’
See id. at 190 n.4 (quoting Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (plurality
opinion)).
114 See id.
115 See id. at 191.
116 Id. at 192.
117 See id. at 192-93.
118 Id. at 193.
119 Id.
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judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’”120 Justice Powell then analyzed Memoirs
under the narrowest grounds doctrine:
Three Justices joined in the controlling opinion in Memoirs.
Two others, Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas
concurred on broader grounds in reversing the judgment
below. They reiterated their well-known position that the
First Amendment provides an absolute shield against
governmental action aimed at suppressing obscenity. Mr.
Justice Stewart also concurred in the judgment, based on his
view that only ‘hardcore pornography’ may be suppressed.
The view of the Memoirs plurality therefore constituted the
holding of the Court and provided governing standards.
Materials were deemed to be constitutionally protected unless
the prosecution carried the burden of proving that they were
‘utterly without redeeming social value,’ and otherwise
satisfied the stringent Memoirs requirements.121
Justice Powell concluded that “Memoirs therefore was the law,” and the defendants
should have been tried under the Memoirs standard for obscenity, rather than the new
Miller test.122 Thus was born the Marks narrowest grounds doctrine.
B. The Supreme Court’s (Non)application of the Narrowest Grounds Doctrine
Commentators have criticized the narrowest grounds doctrine because the
Court itself has refused to apply Marks to fractured decisions where lower courts
struggled to find the narrowest grounds.123 The most prominent example is Grutter
120 See id. (alteration in original) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 169 n. 15 (1976)
(opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
121 Id. at 193-94 (citations omitted).
122 Id. at 194. The actual constitutional basis for overturning the defendants’ convictions in
Marks was an Ex Post Facto Clause argument. See id. at 191. The Marks Court observed,
“We have taken special care to insist on fair warning when a statute regulates expression and
implicates First Amendment values.” Id. at 196.
123 See Mark Alan Thurmon, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value
of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L. J. 419, 436-42 (1992) (detailing “the
Supreme Court’s disregard for the ‘narrowest grounds’ doctrine” and observing that, through
1992, “[t]he Court has cited Marks only four times for the ‘narrowest grounds’ rule-three
times in dissent”); Rafael A. Seminario, The Uncertainty and Debilitation of the Marks
Fractured Opinion Analysis–The Supreme Court Misses an Opportunity: Grutter v.
Bollinger, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 739, 759-62 (2004) (criticizing the Court for side-stepping a
Marks analysis of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) in
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), when many lower courts had struggled to apply
Marks). 
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v. Bollinger,124 where the Court refused to apply a Marks analysis to its fractured
decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.125 In Bakke, Justice
Powell provided the fifth vote to strike down a particular race-conscious admissions
program when the other eight justices were split evenly.126 However, Justice Powell
agreed with the dissent that race could be a proper factor in higher education
admissions programs.127 After Bakke, lower courts applied Marks to determine the
holding in Bakke, concluding, at least in some instances, that Justice Powell’s
opinion controlled.128 However, when the Supreme Court decided Grutter, it refused
to do a Marks analysis of Bakke.129 Instead, it simply adopted Justice Powell’s
Bakke opinion as the rule in Grutter.130
The Court’s pattern of avoiding Marks has led some to question how firmly
the narrowest grounds doctrine binds lower courts.131 One respected article
describes the narrowest grounds doctrine as “a doctrine of limited applicability.”132
The article concludes that the narrowest grounds doctrine
124 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
125 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see Seminario, supra note 123, at 759-62.
126 See Seminario, supra note 123, at 743.
127 See id. at 743.
128 See id. at 751, 760.
129 See id. at 760. In Grutter, Justice O’Connor acknowledged for the majority that “[i]n the
wake of our fractured decision in Bakke, courts have struggled to discern whether Justice
Powell's diversity rationale, set forth in part of the opinion joined by no other Justice, is
nonetheless binding precedent under Marks.” Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325
(2003). She continued, “As the divergent opinions of the lower courts demonstrate,
however, ‘[t]his test is more easily stated than applied to the various opinions supporting the
result in [Bakke].’” Id. (citations omitted). Therefore, Justice O’Connor concluded, the
majority “d[id] not find it necessary to decide whether Justice Powell's opinion is binding
under Marks. It does not seem ‘useful to pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical
possibility when it has so obviously baffled and divided the lower courts that have
considered it.’” Id. (citation omitted).
130 Seminario, supra note 123, at 760.
131 See Thurmon, supra note 123, at 442 (suggesting that “[l]ower courts should take the
Supreme Court’s rejection of the Marks rule as an invitation to follow suit”); Seminario,
supra note 123, at 762 (“Now, instead of clarifying the proper use of the Marks analysis in
Grutter, the Court has most likely increased the likelihood that it will be subject to
whimsical application, subjective interpretation, and more importantly, divisive
disagreement, making it more difficult for lower courts to divine a holding from decisions
where the Court has ‘agreed to disagree.’”).
132 Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 756, 767 (1980).
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is only useful where the plurality and concurring
opinions stand in a “broader-narrower” relation to
each other. Many of the most troublesome plurality
opinions, however, do not fit into this mold, and
lower courts have been left to their own devices to
determine the precedential value of most plurality
opinions.133
The Court has failed to clarify the meaning of the doctrine,134 so it is appropriate to
consider how lower courts have treated it.
C. An Alternative Perspective on the Narrowest Grounds Doctrine
The United States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the Third
Circuit, and the Second Circuit have each recognized that “the Marks ‘narrowest
grounds’ doctrine is not universally applicable.”135 But instead of avoiding its
complexities, as the Grutter Court did, these federal circuits have confronted the
narrowest grounds doctrine and reached a conclusion: The narrowest grounds
doctrine does not always provide an answer to the Court’s fractured decisions.
The District of Columbia Circuit, in King v. Palmer,136 was the first circuit to
offer an alternative to a rigid application of the narrowest grounds doctrine. In King,
the court had to decide on the availability of contingency enhancements to attorneys’
fees.137 The Supreme Court’s most relevant opinion, Pennsylvania v. Delaware
Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air138 (“Delaware Valley II”), was a fractured
decision with a four-justice plurality in which Justice O’Connor concurred in part
and concurred in the judgment.139 Before King, the District of Columbia Circuit had
used Marks to find Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Delaware Valley II
controlling.140 Upon reconsideration, however, the King majority found that Marks
had a more limited applicability than previously believed:
Marks is workable–one opinion can be meaningfully
regarded as "narrower" than another–only when one
133 Novak, supra note 132, at 767.
134 See Seminario, supra note 123, at 760 (“The Court's avoidance of the Marks analysis
severely weakened the analysis as a tool for judicial interpretation of fractured opinions.”).
135 Thurmon, supra note 123, at 442.
136 950 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc).
137 Id. at 773.
138 483 U.S. 711 (1987).
139 See King, 950 F.2d at 776-77.
140 See id. at 780.
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opinion is a logical subset of other, broader opinions. In
essence, the narrowest opinion must represent a common
denominator of the Court's reasoning; it must embody a
position implicitly approved by at least five Justices who
support the judgment.141
The King majority agreed that some of the Court’s fractured decisions, such as
Marks, were cases in which the “‘narrowest grounds’ approach yielded a logical
result.”142 However, the King majority was concerned about some fractured
decisions where applying Marks raised serious problems: 
When, however, one opinion supporting the
judgment does not fit entirely within a broader circle drawn
by the others, Marks is problematic. If applied in situations
where the various opinions supporting the judgment are
mutually exclusive, Marks will turn a single opinion that
lacks majority support into national law. When eight of
nine Justices do not subscribe to a given approach to a legal
question, it surely cannot be proper to endow that approach
with controlling force, no matter how persuasive it may
be.143
In King, the majority was unable to find enough “common ground” between Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence and the plurality decision in Delaware Valley II to decide
“when to apply contingency enhancements.”144 Furthermore, the King majority was
completely at a loss to try to perform a Marks analysis on the question of “how the
contingency enhancement should be calculated.”145 Here, the King majority wrote,
“We do not see how either approach can be thought ‘narrower’ than the other; they
are simply different.”146 As a result, the District of Columbia Circuit was “left
without a controlling opinion or a governing test for awarding contingency
enhancements under Delaware Valley II.”147
Relying upon the reasoning in King, the Third Circuit, in Rappa v. New
Castle County,148 recognized that there must be a “common denominator in the
141 Id. at 781.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 782.
144 Id. at 782-83.
145 Id. at 783.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 18 F.3d 1043 (3d Cir. 1994).
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Court’s reasoning” before Marks could be applied.149 The Rappa court observed that
“[i]n some splintered decisions, there will be three or more distinct approaches, none
of which is a subset of another; instead, each approach is simply different.”150
Where there was no common denominator, “no particular standard constitutes the
law of the land, because no single approach can be said to have the support of a
majority of the Court.”151
Recently, the Second Circuit applied the reasoning in King and Rappa to
reach a similar result in United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.152 The court agreed
with the King majority that the narrowest grounds doctrine “works . . . only when
that narrow opinion [“that is a logical subset of other, broader opinions”] is the
common denominator representing the position approved by at least five justices.”153
Therefore, the court recognized that “[w]hen it is not possible to discover a single
standard that legitimately constitutes the narrowest ground for a decision on that
issue, there is then no law of the land because no one standard commands the support
of a majority of the Supreme Court.”154
One commentator agreed with these circuit courts’ alternate perspective on
the narrowest grounds doctrine: “Marks provides no useful guidance in those cases
in which different Justices take different approaches to the issues. Such decisions
cannot be forced into the Marks ‘narrowest grounds’ mold because of the absence of
any logical connection between the concurring opinions.”155 In King, Rappa, and
Alcan Aluminum Corp., three federal circuits refused to blindly apply Marks,
choosing instead the uncertainty of finding no controlling rule. One lesson to be
gained from these decisions is that lower courts should apply the narrowest grounds
doctrine with a critical eye.
D. A Survey of Lower Court Cases Applying Marks to Seibert
This Part surveys the cases in which lower courts have applied the Marks
narrowest grounds doctrine to Seibert.156 The survey is divided into a majority and
149 Id. at 1058.
150 Id. at 1058 (citations omitted).
151 The Rappa court concluded that “neither the plurality nor the concurrence ‘articulates a
legal standard which, when applied, will necessarily produce results with which a majority
of the Court from that case would agree.’” Id. at 1060 (citation omitted).
152 315 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2003).
153 Id. at 189.
154 Id.
155 Thurmon, supra note 123, at 442.
156 This survey is intended to provide an overview of case law in this area; therefore, while it
is comprehensive, it is not complete. As of April 7, 2006, Westlaw Keycite indicated that
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two minority approaches. The majority of lower courts view Justice Kennedy’s
opinion as the narrowest grounds and, therefore, as controlling. The minority of
lower courts take one of two positions: the first group treats both the plurality’s and
Justice Kennedy’s opinions as controlling, avoiding the need to choose between
them; the second group, currently comprised of only two judges, holds that Seibert
does not have a narrowest grounds and, consequently, does not have a controlling
opinion.
1. Majority Approach
A majority of courts that have applied the Marks narrowest grounds doctrine
to Seibert have concluded that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is the controlling
opinion. Among the federal circuits, the Third,157 Fourth,158 Fifth,159 Seventh,160
Seibert has been cited in approximately 172 cases. Of those cases, approximately forty refer
to Marks.
Several courts have applied Seibert without performing a Marks analysis. See, e.g.,
People v. Paulman, 833 N.E.2d 239, 246-47 & n.5 (N.Y. 2005). Some of these cases may be
helpful to Seibert analysis, but they cannot be given much weight because they fail to
address a central question in Seibert: which opinion controls and under what circumstances.
See id.
For example, the Court of Appeals of New York described the Seibert plurality
opinion as providing a “more stringent test” than Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. Id. The
court believed that any statement admissible under the plurality test necessarily was
admissible under Justice Kennedy’s test, which is not true. See id. A quick refutation will
suffice. If an officer tells a suspect, “I am going to question you first and warn you later,”
and does so, but separates the post-Miranda interrogation in time and place, a judge could
find the statement admissible under the plurality test but inadmissible under Justice
Kennedy’s test. This is because under the plurality test, the Miranda warnings could still be
effective, despite the officer’s threatening words, if the circumstances of the interrogation
make the Miranda warnings effective. On the other hand, the officer’s stated subjective
intent would be enough to allow a judge to find the officer deliberately employed question-
first tactics to violate Miranda, invoking Justice Kennedy’s test.
157 See United States v. Naranjo, 426 F.3d 221, 231-32 (3d Cir. 2005) (“In Seibert, Justice
Kennedy’s opinion provides the narrowest rationale for resolving the issues raised by two-
step interrogations where Miranda warnings are not administered until after police obtain an
inculpatory statement. Accordingly, unless the agents deliberately withheld warnings,
Elstad controls Naranjo’s Miranda claim.”); United States v. Latz, 162 Fed. App. 113, 119-
20 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Because only four Justices joined the opinion of the Supreme Court in
Seibert, and because Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in the judgment is more narrow than the
plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy’s opinion is the holding of the Court.”); United States v.
Kiam, 432 F.3d 524, 532-33 (3d Cir. 2006) (“This Court applies the Seibert plurality opinion
as narrowed by Justice Kennedy.”) (citing United States v. Naranjo, 426 F.3d 221, 231-32
(3d Cir. 2005)).
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Eighth,161 and Ninth162 Circuits have followed the majority approach. At the federal
trial court level, judges on the district courts for the District of Minnesota,163 the
158 See United States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303, 308-09 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Justice Kennedy’s
opinion therefore represents the holding of the Seibert Court: The admissibility of
postwarning statements is governed by Elstad unless the deliberate ‘question-first’ strategy
is employed.”).
159 United States v. Sinclair, No. 05-40544, 2006 WL 616030, at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 13, 2006)
(“After review of the briefs and record in this case we are convinced that the confession at
issue is admissible in the light of Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), and Missouri v.
Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), the ultimate holding of which we find in Justice Kennedy's
concurrence.”).
160 See United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 1089-90 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Justice Kennedy
thus provided a fifth vote to depart from Elstad, but only where the police set out
deliberately to withhold Miranda warnings until after a confession has been secured. Where
the initial violation of Miranda was not part of a deliberate strategy to undermine the
warnings, Elstad appears to have survived Seibert.”); see also United States v. Peterson, 414
F.3d 825, 827-28 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 1086-90
(7th Cir. 2004)).
161 See United States v. Ollie, No. 05-2503, 2006 WL 829755, at *5-7 (8th Cir. Mar. 31,
2006) (“Because Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote and his concurrence resolved the
case on narrower grounds than did the plurality, it is his reasoning that rules the present
case.”).
The Eighth Circuit’s views on Seibert have been difficult to place, but the circuit
seems to have recently settled this confusion. The circuit’s early opinions in 2004 applied
what is essentially the first minority approach, analyzing question-first interrogations under
both the plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence while hoping the tests agreed.
See United States v. Aguilar, 384 F.3d 520, 524-25 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding both the plurality
test and Justice Kennedy’s concerns satisfied, without referring specifically to Marks);
United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez, 384 F.3d 562, 566-67 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding both
the Kennedy and plurality tests met, without citing Marks).
In another 2004 case, an Eighth Circuit panel hinted that Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence was of “special significance.” See United States v. Briones, 390 F.3d 610, 613-
14 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Because Justice Kennedy relied on grounds narrower than those of the
plurality, his opinion is of special significance.”) reh’g denied. Yet, the court did not fully
commit to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. See id. at 614 n.3 (observing that the “statements
would also be admissible under the multifactor test fashioned by the Seibert plurality”).
In 2005, one panel appeared to confirm the Eighth Circuit’s commitment to the first
minority approach. See United States v. Fellers, 397 F.3d 1090, 1097-98 (8th Cir. 2005)
(applying the plurality’s “multi-factor test,” then applying Justice Kennedy’s concurrence,
and finding both tests satisfied); United States v. Terry, 400 F.3d 575, 581-83 (8th Cir. 2005)
(finding it likely that all nine Justices from Seibert would agree with its analysis). However,
another 2005 panel reversed the trend by citing to Marks and declaring that Justice
Kennedy’s deliberateness test was outcome determinative. See United States v. Black Bear,
422 F.3d 658, 664 (8th Cir. 2005).
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District of Nebraska,164 the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,165 and the Western
District of Pennsylvania166 have applied the majority approach. State appellate
courts in the following states have also followed the majority approach:
California,167 Kentucky,168 Maryland,169 and Washington.170
The Eighth Circuit’s alliance with the majority approach was confirmed by the first
panel to consider the question in 2006. See United States v. Ollie, No. 05-2503, 2006 WL
829755, at *6 (8th Cir. Mar. 31, 2006). The panel admitted that the Eighth Circuit had
applied the plurality test in the past. See id. Nevertheless, the panel concluded in a single-
sentence analysis that Justice Kennedy’s opinion was the controlling opinion. See id.
(“Because Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote and his concurrence resolved the case on
narrower grounds than did the plurality, it is his reasoning that rules the present case.”).
See also United States v. Banks, No. Civ. 05-426JNE/FLN, 2006 WL 839508, at *8-
10 (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2006), which analyzes the Eighth Circuit’s approach to Seibert and,
without the help of the recent panel decision in Ollie, treats Justice Kennedy’s opinion as
controlling.
162 See United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006) (“This narrower test–
that excludes confessions made after a deliberate, objectively ineffective midstream
warning–represents Seibert’s holding.”); But see Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d at 1138-42
(rejecting Justice Kennedy’s concurrence and accepting the plurality opinion) (Berzon, C.J.,
dissenting in part); United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1129-30 (9th Cir.
2005) (declining to decide whether “to follow the plurality opinion in Seibert or only that
opinion as limited by Justice Kennedy, because Seibert did not address the issue raised in
this case.”).
163 See United States v. Banks, No. Civ. 05-426JNE/FLN, 2006 WL 839508, at *8-10 (D.
Minn. Mar. 30, 2006) (“The Court concludes from the holding of the Supreme Court in
Seibert that a subsequent statement made by a defendant after Miranda warnings have been
issued will be suppressed if the defendant was previously interrogated without waiving his
Miranda rights but only if the Court finds a deliberate effort on the part of law enforcement
to circumvent the protections of Miranda.”).
164 See United States v. Hansen, No. 8:05CR186, 2005 WL 2655468, at *2 (D. Neb. Oct. 18,
2005).
165 See United States v. Kiam, 343 F. Supp. 2d 398, 408-10 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (“Because
Justice Kennedy provided the requisite fifth vote, we examine the limitations he was at pains
to enunciate in his concurring opinion.”).
166 See United States v. Yamba, No. 2:04 CR 329, 2006 WL 41182, at *13 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 6,
2006) (citing United States v. Naranjo, 426 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2005)).
167 See People v. Roberts, No. D043221 (Super. Ct. No. SCD169869), 2005 WL 615851, at
*12 (Cal. Ct. App. March 17, 2005) (“Therefore, in interpreting Seibert, we adopt the
rationale expressed by Justice Kennedy, who supplied the fifth and necessary vote and
concurred in the judgment on the narrowest ground.” (citing Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188, 193 (1977))); In re Richard G., No. H026504 (Santa Clara County Superior Court
No. J125855), 2005 WL 428967, at *8-11 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2005) (“Since Justice
Kennedy ‘supplied the fifth vote in [Seibert], and concurred on grounds narrower than those
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The Ninth Circuit’s recent opinion in United States v. Williams171 is an
example of the majority approach. After describing Elstad and Seibert, the court
noted that in Seibert, “[a]lthough five Justices agreed that Seibert’s postwarning
statement was inadmissible, the case did not produce a majority opinion.”172
Therefore, lacking a majority opinion, the court had to “decide how to interpret
Seibert in light of these splintered decisions.”173 Citing the Marks narrowest grounds
put forth by the plurality, [his] position is controlling.’” (citing Romano v. Oklahoma, 512
U.S. 1, 9 (1994))); People v. Brown, No. H026138 (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No.
CC256280), 2004 WL 2384330, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2004) (“As Justice Kennedy
supplied the fifth vote in Seibert, and concurred on grounds narrower that those put forth by
the plurality, his position is controlling.” (citing Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9
(1994))); People v. Knight, No. C042870 (Sup. Ct. No. TF030730A), 2005 WL 1478995, at
*9 (Cal. Ct. App. June 21, 2005) (“Justice Kennedy's concurrence was necessary to make up
a majority and relied on narrower grounds, thereby setting forth the rule of decision.”);
People v. Dutra, No. C044075 (Sup. Ct. No. SF085258B), 2005 WL 1177582, at *12 (Cal.
Ct. App. May 18, 2005) (“Justice Kennedy's concurrence was necessary to make up a
majority and relied on narrower grounds, thereby setting forth the rule of decision.”); People
v. Hall, No. C042586 (Sup. Ct. No. 01F00138), 2004 WL 2526699, at *8-9 (Cal. Ct. App.
Nov. 9, 2004) (“According to Justice Kennedy's concurrence, required to make up a
majority, there must be some curative steps taken in between [the interrogations] . . . .”).
As a caveat, the author notes that none of the California Court of Appeal decisions
was reported in the state reporter, and, therefore, none of them may be cited as binding
precedent in California. However, six unpublished opinions from the California Court of
Appeal arguably together constitute an implicit precedent.
168 See Callihan v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 123, 125-26 (Ky. 2004) (“Here, the
narrowest grounds are those set forth in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion.”); Jackson v.
Commonwealth, Nos. 2004-SC-0118-MR, 2004-SC-0319-MR, 2006 WL 733991, at *6 (Ky.
March 23, 2006) (plurality opinion) (“We have determined that the narrowest holding,
rendered by Justice Kennedy, precludes use of the technique only ‘where police deliberately
employ the technique to circumvent the suspect's Miranda rights.’”) (quoting Callihan, 142
S.W.3d at 125-26)).
169 See Cooper v. State, 877 A.2d 1095, 1107 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (“Because Justice
Kennedy’s opinion sets forth the narrowest grounds on which the case is decided, it
represents the holding of the Court; it is therefore Justice Kennedy’s test that applies to this
and like cases.”).
170 State v. Andrusiv, No. 53923-0-I, 2005 WL 1345438, at *2 & n.14 (Wash. Ct. App. June
6, 2005) (“Because Justice Kennedy relied on grounds narrower than those of the plurality,
his opinion is of special significance.”); State v. T.R., No. 54156-1-I, 2005 WL 221888, at
*3 n.14 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2005) (“Because Justice Kennedy relied on grounds
narrower than those of the plurality, his opinion is of special significance.”).
171 435 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2006).
172 Id. at 1155.
173 Id. at 1157 (alteration in original).
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doctrine, the court declared that it “need not find a legal opinion which a majority
joined, but merely ‘a legal standard which, when applied, will produce results with
which a majority of the Court from that case would agree.’”174 The court believed
that “[t]o determine whether Seibert contains a precedential holding, we must
identify and apply a test which satisfies the requirements of both Justice Souter’s
plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.”175
The Williams court then applied Marks to Seibert. The court noted that while
“the plurality would consider all two-stage interrogations eligible for a Seibert
inquiry, Justice Kennedy’s opinion narrowed the Seibert exception to those cases
involving the deliberate use of the two-step procedure to weaken Miranda’s
protections.”176 The court found that the plurality and Justice Kennedy agreed that
confessions obtained through a deliberate use of two-stage interrogations were
inadmissible.177 Consequently, “[t]his narrower test–that excludes confessions made
after a deliberate, ineffective midstream warning–represents Seibert’s holding.”178
All other two-stage interrogations would still be controlled by Elstad’s voluntariness
test.179
After establishing that Justice Kennedy’s test was controlling, the Williams
court observed that Justice Kennedy failed to provide guidance for what constituted a
deliberate two-step interrogation.180 The court believed that both objective and
subjective evidence should be considered when deciding if the two-step interrogation
was deliberate.181 This forced the court to use the plurality’s five-factor test to
analyze the facts for deliberateness.182 Only if there was a deliberate two-step
174 Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir. 1991).
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 See id. at 1158. The Williams court explained,
In other words, both the plurality and Justice Kennedy
agree that where law enforcement officers deliberately
employ a two-step interrogation to obtain a confession and
where separations of time and circumstances and
additional curative warnings are absent or fail to apprise a
reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes of his rights, the
trial court should suppress the confession.
Id.
178 Id.
179 See id.
180 See id. at 1158 & n.11.
181 See id. at 1158-59.
182 See id. at 1159.
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interrogation would the court have to determine whether the midstream warnings
were effective.183 Again, the court believed that it should “look both to the objective
circumstances the plurality cited . . . and to the curative measures [described by
Justice Kennedy]” to decide the effectiveness of the warnings.184
2. The First Minority Approach
A minority of lower courts that have applied Marks to Seibert have not found
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence controlling. These courts have followed one of
several different approaches. The first minority approach is used by the Eleventh
Circuit,185 the Court of Appeals of Alaska,186 the Northern District of Iowa,187 and
the Southern District of Indiana.188 It could be called the “alternative argument”
approach. The alternative argument is familiar to many lawyers from their law
school days, when professors instructed them to argue in the alternative on their
exams; it also shares some similarities with the concept of alternative pleading in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.189 Courts using the alternative argument approach
generally analyze the facts under both the plurality decision and under Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence. As long as the results of the two analyses are the same, the
courts do not specify which analysis is outcome determinative. The Court of
Appeals of Alaska varies the alternative argument approach by applying the plurality
test and then finding that the dissent’s broader test was also met.190
183 See id. at 1160.
184 Id.
185 See United States v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, Jr., No. 04-12536, 2006 WL 212224, at *9-11
(11th Cir. 2006) (refusing to resolve the “dispute over whether Elstad or Seibert controls,”
holding that the plurality test was satisfied, and that Justice Kennedy’s test did not apply to
the facts before the court).
186 Crawford v. State, 100 P.3d 440, 450 (Ala. Ct. App. 2004).
187 United States v. Johnson, No. CR05-4063-MWB, 2005 WL 2704892, at *14 (N.D. Iowa
Oct. 20, 2005) (stating that the Eighth Circuit “applies a multi-factor test derived from the
Court’s plurality test in Seibert.”).
188 See United States v. Thomas, No. IP04-0106-CR-01-H/F, 2004 WL 3059794, *8 (S.D.
Ind. Dec. 16, 2004) (holding that suppression was not necessary under either the plurality’s
or Justice Kennedy’s opinion).
189 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (“Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be
demanded.”).
190 See Crawford, 100 P.3d at 450 (“We further conclude that Crawford's post-Miranda
statements must be suppressed even under the broader reading of Elstad advocated by the
Seibert dissenters.”).
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Courts use the alternative argument approach to avoid committing to a
position unless absolutely necessary.191 However, because the alternative argument
approach does not resolve the fractured decision dilemma, it is a delay tactic rather
than a solution. At one time, the Eighth Circuit was in the alternative argument
camp, but as more panels heard question-first cases, the circuit gradually pitched its
tent further and further away until the circuit landed squarely in the majority
approach’s camp.192 The Eleventh Circuit will eventually face the same decision.
3. The Second Minority Approach
The second minority approach rejects Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as the
narrowest grounds and allows the court to create its own rule. Only two judges have
endorsed this approach. The first was Ninth Circuit Judge Marsha S. Berzon in her
dissenting opinion in United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado.193 The other two judges
on the panel in Rodriguez-Preciado held that Seibert was not applicable, but Judge
Berzon reached the Seibert issue.194
Judge Berzon began her Marks analysis by explaining that “[g]enerally,
where there is no majority opinion, the narrowest opinion adhered to by at least five
Justices controls. Applying the Marks rule to Seibert, however, is not a
straightforward analysis.”195 In a subtle critique of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, Judge
Berzon conceded that Justice Kennedy’s reasoning was “arguably narrower” than the
plurality’s but observed in a footnote that it was Justice Kennedy himself who
“characterized his opinion as ‘narrower.’”196
Judge Berzon identified Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as focusing on the
“deliberateness on the part of the police–or lack thereof” rather than “the objective
effectiveness factors outlined in Justice Souter’s plurality opinion.”197 However,
seven justices “decisively rejected any subjective good faith consideration, based on
191 This is also one of the benefits that accrues to law students who argue in the alternative
on their exams.
192 See supra note 161.
193 399 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2005); see United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th
Cir. 2006) (acknowledging that, the Marks analysis was a “question of first impression in
[the Ninth] [C]ircuit, although Judge Berzon has provided thoughtful guidance in a recent
dissenting opinion” (citing United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1138-43
(9th Cir. 2005) (Berzon, J., dissenting in part))).
194 See Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d at 1129-30, 1133 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part).
195 Id. at 1139 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part).
196 See id. at 1139 & n.10 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part).
197 Id. at 1139 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part).
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deliberateness.”198 This analysis led Judge Berzon to conclude that Justice
Kennedy’s opinion had the support of “two Justices, at most” (because Justice
Breyer had at least partially concurred in Justice Kennedy’s opinion).199
Consequently, Judge Berzon reached the same general conclusion as Judge Azrack,
that Marks did not provide a solution.200 The only answer that Marks did provide is
that Justice Kennedy’s opinion could not be controlling.201
The next question facing Judge Berzon was what to do if Justice Kennedy’s
opinion was not controlling.202 Neither the dissent nor the plurality was binding, so
that meant there was no controlling precedent, and the Ninth Circuit was free to
decide the issue.203 Judge Berzon concluded that the Ninth Circuit should adopt the
plurality position, something other circuits had done in similar situations.204
Subsequently, in United States v. Williams,205 the Ninth Circuit refused to adopt
Judge Berzon’s analysis and went with the majority approach.206
The other judge who has adopted the second minority approach is the Chief
United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of New York, Joan M.
Azrack. Judge Azrack presented this position in United States v. Cohen.207 In
Cohen, Judge Azrack analyzed Seibert in light of Marks and concluded that Justice
Kennedy’s opinion could not be the “narrowest grounds” for two reasons and,
therefore, could not be controlling.208 The first reason Justice Kennedy’s opinion
198 Id. (Berzon, J., dissenting in part).
199 See id. at 1139 & n.12, 1140 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part).
200 See id. at 1141 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part).
201 See id. (Berzon, J., dissenting in part) (“As I read it, in agreement with other circuits’
opinions discussed above, Marks does not prescribe the adoption as governing precedent of a
position squarely rejected by seven Justices. Justice Kennedy’s opinion on the admissibility
standard therefore cannot govern.”).
202 See id. (Berzon, J., dissenting in part).
203 See id. (Berzon, J., dissenting in part).
204 See id. (Berzon, J., dissenting in part).
205 No. 04-50182, 2006 WL 213852 (9th Cir. Jan. 30, 2006).
206 See No. 04-50182, 2006 WL 213852, *7-9 (9th Cir. Jan. 30, 2006); see also discussion
supra Part III.C.1.
207 372 F. Supp. 2d 340 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
208 Judge Azrack wrote, “I disagree with courts which have found Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence to be the narrowest grounds for the judgment, and do not consider the
concurrence controlling.” Id. at 353; see Cooper v. State, 877 A.2d 1095, 1107 n.5 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2005) (noting that “One United States District Court judge disagrees that Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence represents the Court’s holding.” (citing United States v. Cohen, 372
F. Supp. 2d 340, 353 (E.D.N.Y. 2005))). Cf. Sorto v. Herbert, 364 F. Supp. 2d 240, 241
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was not the “narrowest grounds” in Seibert was that at least three of the Justices in
the plurality and the four Justices in the dissent rejected Justice Kennedy’s reliance
on subjective intent.209 Therefore, “Justice Kennedy’s rule, rejected by a large
majority of the court, cannot be Seibert’s holding.”210 As discussed above in Part
II.D.6, while the plurality did not explicitly reject a subjective standard, it endorsed
an objective standard and implied that a subjective standard was unnecessary and
would normally be worthless.211
The second reason Justice Kennedy’s concurrence was not the narrowest
grounds was that Justice Kennedy’s “analysis . . . is ‘simply different’ than that
articulated by the plurality, not a logical subset.”212 This lack of congruence between
Justice Kennedy’s and the plurality’s positions meant that Marks could not produce a
satisfactory rationale for the holding in Seibert.213 In other words, although Justice
Kennedy and the plurality agreed about the result in Seibert, they did not agree about
how to reach the result in such a way that Justice Kennedy’s reasoning could be
categorized as a subset of the plurality’s reasoning.214 Under such circumstances,
Marks was not designed to lead to a conclusion, and so there was no possible
narrowest holding.215
Judge Azrack relied upon the decision in Alcan Aluminum Corp., where the
Second Circuit explained, “‘[W]hen it is not possible to discover a single standard
that legitimately constitutes the narrowest ground for a decision on that issue, there is
then no law of the land because no one standard commands the support of a majority
of the Supreme Court.’”216 Therefore, the only identifiable result in Seibert was that
“Elstad does not control all situations of question-first interrogations; that sometimes
warned confessions related to previous unwarned confessions must be
suppressed.”217
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (relying on Justice Kennedy’s concurrence to reject defendant’s argument
of an alleged question-first Miranda violation).
E.D.N.Y.,2004.
209 Cohen, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 353-54.
210 Cohen, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 354.
211 See discussion supra Part II.D.6.
212 Cohen, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 354 (quoting King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 783 (D.C.
Cir.1991) (en banc)).
213 Cohen, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 354.
214 Cohen, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 354.
215 See Cohen, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 354.
216 Id. at 353 (quoting United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir.
2003) (citations omitted)).
217 Id. at 355.
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Without a controlling opinion to apply, Judge Azrack concluded that she was
“left to devise a test to determine whether to suppress statements made in a question-
first situation, in other words, to determine whether midstream Miranda warnings
could be considered effective.”218 Judge Azrack’s solution was to synthesize the
plurality’s five-factor test with Justice Kennedy’s concern for curative measures to
evaluate the effectiveness of the Miranda warnings.219 Applying this test, Judge
Azrack found the warnings were effective, and so the second statement was
admissible.220
No other court has yet taken the bold approach of Judges Berzon and Azrack,
but as Part IV explains, their approach is one that courts should consider when faced
with question-first interrogations.
IV. WHY JUSTICE KENNEDY’S CONCURRENCE IN SEIBERT IS NOT THE “NARROWEST
GROUNDS”
Despite what a majority of lower courts have held, under a correct Marks
analysis, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Seibert is not the narrowest grounds. The
majority approach in applying Marks to Seibert is incorrect, as Section IV.A
explains. The correct approach is the second minority approach, which says that
there is no narrowest grounds in Seibert, and courts must therefore decide for
themselves how to handle statements derived from question-first interrogations, the
topic of Part V.
A. The Majority Approach to Seibert is Incorrect
The majority approach, using Marks to declare that Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence is the controlling opinion in Seibert, is incorrect for at least four reasons.
The first reason is the most convincing: seven Justices disagreed with Justice
Kennedy. With regard to the plurality, Justice Kennedy himself noted their
differences with him.221 As explained in Part II.C.6, the plurality endorsed an
objective test for question-first interrogations and implicitly found a subjective
inquiry unnecessary.222 Granted, the plurality did not shy away from calling
question-first tactics “a police strategy adapted to undermine the Miranda
warnings,”223 but the plurality immediately qualified this recognition by explaining
218 Id.
219 See id. at 355-58.
220 See id. at 358-59.
221 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 616 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
222 See supra Part II.C.6.
223 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616 (plurality opinion).
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that “the focus is on facts apart from intent that show the question-first tactic at
work.”224 This is at least partly “[b]ecause the intent of the officer will rarely be as
candidly admitted as it was” in Seibert.225 At the very least, the four Justices
comprising the plurality did not believe that Justice Kennedy’s deliberateness test
would adequately protect suspects’ constitutional rights. Justice O’Connor, speaking
for the four dissenting Justices, was more outspoken in her criticism of allowing the
interrogator’s subjective intent to play a role in admissibility determinations, stating,
“I believe that the approach espoused by Justice Kennedy is ill advised.”226
In Rodriguez-Preciado, Judge Berzon suggests that Justice Breyer’s
concurrence indicates that he may agree with Justice Kennedy on the intent issue.227
This is debatable, since Justice Breyer joined in the plurality opinion in full and
endorsed a good-faith interpretation of Elstad.228 However, that still leaves a seven-
to-two majority rejecting Justice Kennedy’s deliberateness test.229 While the Marks
rule may be satisfied at a highly theoretical and superficial level, it is paradoxical to
find that the narrowest grounds doctrine is satisfied under such circumstances.230
The second reason the majority approach is incorrect is that Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence is “simply different” than the plurality’s opinion.231 The
narrowest grounds doctrine implies that one of the concurring opinions will be
“narrower,” but here “neither [of the analyses] is a logical subset of the other.”232
The nature of Justice Kennedy’s subjective intent inquiry is different than the
plurality’s objective factor-based test.233
224 Id. at 616 n.6.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 626 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
227 See United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1139 n.12 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Berzon, J., dissenting in part).
228 See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617-18.
229 See id. at 1140 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part); United States v. Cohen, 372 F. Supp. 2d
340, 353-54 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Justice Kennedy’s rule, rejected by a large majority of the
court, cannot be Seibert’s holding.”).
230 See King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc) (“When eight of nine
Justices do not subscribe to a given approach to a legal question, it surely cannot be proper
to endow that approach with controlling force, no matter how persuasive it may be.”).
231 See Cohen, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 354 (“Justice Kennedy’s opinion cannot be the narrowest
for another reason. Justice Kennedy laid out an analysis which is ‘simply different’ than that
articulated by the plurality, not a logical subset.” (quoting King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 783
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc))).
232 See Cohen, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 354.
233 See Cohen, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 354.
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The “simply different” concept is best illustrated by two analogies from
mathematics. The first is the common denominator, which, in mathematics, is a
number by which two other numbers are both divisible. For example, the common
denominator of 4 and 6 is 2. The three federal circuits that found an alternative
approach to Marks each believed that only a common denominator in legal reasoning
between two non-majority opinions could be the narrowest grounds.234 If two
opinions did not have a common denominator, there could be no narrowest grounds
between them. Consistent with the principles in King, Rappa, and Alcan Aluminum
Corp., Judge Berzon and Judge Azrack found no common denominator between
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence and the plurality’s opinion in Seibert because Justice
Kennedy’s reasoning was “simply different” than the plurality’s.235 Justice Kennedy
focused on the deliberate nature of the interrogation while the plurality focused on
the circumstances of the interrogation.236
The second mathematical analogy is to Venn diagrams, in which groups or
collections of objects or things (called “sets” in mathematics) are drawn as circles
that may (1) overlap entirely; (2) overlap partially; or (3) not overlap at all. The
King court described this principle in layman’s terms: “Marks is workable–one
opinion can be meaningfully regarded as ‘narrower’ than another–only when one
opinion is a logical subset of other, broader opinions.”237 Although the results from
Justice Kennedy’s and the plurality’s tests could overlap partially, the reasoning, the
“grounds,” required to reach those results does not overlap: In one case, the grounds
are the subjective intent of the interrogator, in the other, the circumstances of the
interrogation.238 As Judge Berzon summarized this analysis, “The only point not
enjoying the assent of five Justices is the appropriate admissibility standard to apply
[to exceptions to Elstad], on which the Court is split 4-1-4.”239 Echoing Judge
Berzon, Judge Azrack wrote, “Only a recognition that deliberate circumvention of
Miranda is unconstitutional [the partially overlapping result], but for different
reasons and after separate analyses [the grounds], binds the plurality and Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence.”240 The reasoning in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is
“simply different,” so his opinion is not the narrowest grounds upon which the
plurality agreed with him; the narrowest grounds upon which the plurality agreed
with Justice Kennedy is his concurrence in the judgment.
234 See discussion supra Part III.C.
235 See Cohen, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 353-54; Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d at 1140.
236 See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611-12, 622.
237 King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc).
238 See Cohen, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 354 (“The Marks methodology reviews splintered opinions
to determine whether any of the grounds for the result are a logical subset of other grounds,
not whether a result is within a larger category of results.”).
239 See Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d at 1141.
240 See Cohen, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 355.
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At least three other criticisms may be leveled at the majority approach to the
Marks-Seibert question. The first criticism is that the majority approach relies upon
circular reasoning. Some lower court opinions, rather than thoroughly applying
Marks, rely upon Justice Kennedy’s own characterization of his opinion as
“narrower” to justify finding that Justice Kennedy’s opinion is the narrowest
grounds.241 Citing to Justice Kennedy’s self-interpretation short-circuits the
necessary legal reasoning.
The second criticism is that some lower courts that applied Marks to Seibert
were hasty in their consideration of the issues and did not fully evaluate how the
Supreme Court and the federal circuits have applied Marks in the past.242 Courts
need to make decisions based on imperfect guidance from the Supreme Court;
however, several circuits, the Eighth and the Eleventh, at least temporarily avoided
making a hasty decision through the alternative argument approach.243
The final criticism is that Elstad already encompasses most circumstances
that would arise under Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. Even Justice Kennedy admits
his test would “apply . . . only in the infrequent case” where question-first tactics
were deliberately employed; he would place most interrogations under Elstad’s
voluntariness test.244 However, as the Seibert dissent notes, Patrice Seibert’s second
statement might still be suppressed under Elstad.245 Any time the interrogator
affirmatively expresses a subjective intent to violate Miranda through the question-
first tactic, the interrogator will probably use coercive techniques that could make
both the pre- and post-warning interrogations involuntary.
B. The Second Minority Approach to Seibert is Correct
The second minority approach embodies the correct application of the
narrowest grounds doctrine to Seibert. As discussed in Part IV.A above, both Judge
Berzon and Judge Azrack properly concluded that Marks did not lead to a “narrowest
241 See, e.g., United States v. Naranjo, 426 F.3d 221, (3d Cir. 2005) (“Justice Kennedy would
therefore apply a ‘narrower test’ . . . .” (quoting Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622
(2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)). This point was subtly highlighted by
Judge Berzon in Rodriguez-Preciado. See United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d
1118, 1139 & n.10 (9th Cir. 2005) (Berzon, J., dissenting in part) (noting that while Justice
Kennedy’s reasoning was “arguably narrower,” it was the Justice himself who first
“characterized his opinion as ‘narrower.’”).
242 Cf. United States v. Thomas, No. IP04-0106-CR-01-H/F, 2004 WL 3059794, at *4-5, 8
(S.D. Ind. Dec. 16, 2004) with United States v. Cohen, 372 F. Supp. 2d 340, 351-59
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).
243 See discussion supra Part III.C.2.
244 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
245 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 628-29 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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ground” between the plurality’s opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. To the
contrary, these two judges believed that it would be counterintuitive and unsound for
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence to be the controlling opinion under Marks.246 This
judgment was confirmed by the Second Circuit, the D.C. Circuit, and, implicitly in
Grutter, the Supreme Court: Where the narrowest grounds doctrine cannot produce a
logical basis for the judgment, it is counterproductive to try to create one.247
While rejecting Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as the narrowest grounds,
Judge Berzon and Judge Azrack recognized that something must be drawn from
Seibert.248 Judge Azrack identified that something as simply “the specific result”
and went on to observe that “[a] fair characterization [of the result] is that Elstad
does not control all situations of question-first interrogations; that sometimes warned
confessions related to previous unwarned confessions must be suppressed.”249 What
those situations are is a matter for lower courts to decide.250
V. WHAT SHOULD COURTS DO?
If there is no controlling precedent for at least some question-first scenarios,
lower courts must “decide how to decide” the admissibility of defendants’ statements
obtained through question-first interrogations.251 Courts have four options, ranked
here by merit: (1) adopt the plurality opinion; (2) synthesize Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence with the plurality opinion; (3) adopt Justice Kennedy’s concurrence; or
(4) devise a new test. The best of these options is the first.
A. Courts Should Adopt the Plurality Opinion
Given the choice, courts should adopt the Seibert plurality opinion. The
Constitution guarantees to each person the right to not “be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.”252 The judiciary is the institution entrusted to
protect this constitutional right from being trampled or abused by the other two
branches of government. For fifty years now, the judiciary has defended the
246 See discussion supra Part IV.A.
247 See discussion supra Part III.B–C.
248 See Cohen, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 355; Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d at 1140-41.
249 Cohen, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 355. Judge Berzon seemed to agree: “The existence of
exceptions to Elstad enjoys the support of five Justices.” Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d at
1141.
250 See Cohen, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 355; Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d at 1141.
251 See Cohen, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 355; Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d at 1141.
252 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2006] Courts, Cops, Citizens, and Criminals 40
privilege through Miranda warnings. Today, question-first tactics threaten the
efficacy of those warnings.
Most importantly, the plurality opinion protects the efficacy of the Miranda
warnings from being manipulated by the state. As the Seibert plurality observed, the
state often gains a benefit from giving Miranda warnings because the warnings
almost always ensure that subsequent statements will be admissible for purposes of
proving guilt.253 However, this “virtual ticket of admissibility”254 presumes that the
suspect’s constitutional rights have been provided to him. Question-first tactics
manipulate this guarantee by withholding those rights at the moment a suspect most
needs to know them, when he is in custody and facing interrogation.255 The Miranda
Court instituted the warnings because it was primarily concerned with psychological,
rather than physical, coercion in interrogations.256 When facing question-first
interrogations, courts face the same question: Should the state be permitted to take
advantage of a suspect’s psychological vulnerability? The plurality opinion’s five-
factor test allows courts to wrest ultimate control over the interrogation out of the
hands of law enforcement. While a police officer may swear from the stand that she
did not intend to violate Miranda by questioning first, the trial court can assess “the
completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of
interrogation” and “the overlapping content of the two statements” to decide for
itself whether the state manipulated the efficacy of Miranda warnings.257
The plurality opinion also prevents the state from turning the Miranda
warnings against the suspect. Withholding the warnings when the suspect most
needs them and giving them to him when the state most needs them is like grabbing
the suspect’s constitutional shield, turning it into a sword, and attacking him with it.
The primary purpose of Miranda warnings is to protect the suspect’s privilege
against self-incrimination, not to assist the state in eliciting a confession from the
suspect (this is a by-product of the warnings). The Miranda Court believed that it
was the state’s job to prosecute the suspect, and courts were therefore charged with
the responsibility of ensuring that the state did not depend upon “the cruel, simple
expedient of compelling [incriminating evidence] from [the suspect’s] own
mouth.”258 The Seibert plurality’s test, by requiring the warnings to precede any
questioning, prevents the state from timing Miranda warnings to its advantage.
Besides providing appropriate protection for constitutional rights, the Seibert
plurality opinion is consistent with Miranda, with the most relevant Miranda cases,
253 See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09 (2004) (plurality opinion).
254 Id. at 609.
255 See id. at 612-13.
256 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966).
257 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615.
258 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460.
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and with the Court’s general criminal procedure jurisprudence. First, at the most
basic level, the plurality opinion is consistent with Miranda itself. The plurality is
consistent with Miranda’s original holding, which requires warnings to be given
before any interrogation begins.259 The plurality opinion is also consistent with
Miranda’s quasi-constitutional nature because it protects the Fifth Amendment
privilege with a judicially-created, fact-based procedural mechanism to protect the
privilege.260 Finally, the plurality opinion is consistent with Miranda’s two
rationales, personal autonomy and evidentiary reliability.261 With respect to personal
autonomy, the objective factor-based test prevents interrogators from using
psychological manipulation or coercion to obtain a confessions from their subjects
and imposes a threshold of conduct which an interrogator may not cross without
risking exclusion of the defendant’s statements.262 With respect to evidentiary
reliability, the plurality opinion is consistent with two principles the Miranda Court
expressed: Courts will not question whether the test must be met in particular cases,
but if the test is met, there is a “virtual guarantee” of admissibility.263
The plurality opinion is consistent with the most relevant Miranda cases,
Elstad and Dickerson. It treats Elstad as a good-faith mistake exception, which
“pos[es] no threat to warn-first practice generally.”264 At the same time, it supports
Dickerson’s reaffirmation of the “constitutional character” of Miranda by responding
to a “new challenge to Miranda” with new prophylactic protections, refusing to
return to what the Seibert plurality calls the “old way of doing things” through a
case-by-case voluntariness determination.265
On a very general level, the plurality opinion is consistent with the Court’s
criminal procedure jurisprudence. Justice O’Connor devotes over three pages of her
dissent to this topic, during which she praises the plurality for rejecting both the fruit
259 See discussion supra Part II.A.
260 See discussion supra Part II.A.
261 See discussion supra Part II.A.
262 See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 612-14 (2004) (plurality opinion). Justice Souter
expressed the plurality’s concern with psychological manipulation: “Upon hearing warnings
only in the aftermath of interrogation and just after making a confession, a suspect would
hardly think he had a genuine right to remain silent, let alone persist in so believing once the
police began to lead him over the same ground again. A more likely reaction on a suspect’s
part would be perplexity about the reason for discussing rights at that point, bewilderment
being an unpromising frame of mind for knowledgeable decision.” See id. at 613.
263 Cf. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617 (excluding defendant’s postwarning statements “[b]ecause
the question-first tactic effectively threatens to thwart Miranda’s purpose of reducing the
risk that a coerced confession would be admitted and because the facts here do not
reasonably support a conclusion that the warnings given could have served their purpose”).
264 See id. at 614-15.
265 Id. at 609.
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of the poisonous tree analysis and Justice Kennedy’s intent-based test.266 Justice
O’Connor found the plurality’s opinion to be consistent with several of the Court’s
criminal procedure cases, including Moran v. Burbine, New York v. Quarles, United
States v. Patane, Harris v. New York, United States v. Leon, and Whren v. United
States.267
Finally, as Judge Berzon observed in Rodriguez-Preciado, several federal
circuits have adopted Supreme Court plurality decisions in other contexts, relying on
them as persuasive authority rather than binding precedent.268 This is the course that
Judge Berzon ultimately recommends.269 For all of these reasons, the plurality
opinion is the best approach a court could choose to respond to the new challenge
posed by question-first tactics.
B. Courts Should Not Synthesize Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence with the Plurality
Opinion
Another option for lower courts deciding how to evaluate the admissibility of
postwarning statements is to synthesize Justice Kennedy’s concurrence with the
plurality opinion. There are many ways to synthesize the plurality opinion with
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. The first minority approach to the Marks analysis of
Seibert is the most logical synthesis because it applies both the plurality’s five-factor
test and Justice Kennedy’s deliberateness inquiry. While this approach would seem
to honor the merits of the plurality without ignoring Justice Kennedy’s contribution,
incorporating a “deliberateness” inquiry would be unhelpful in most cases and could
distract courts from more important questions.
If the synthesis relies heavily on the “deliberateness” inquiry in Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence, it would conflict with the views of at least seven of the
Seibert Justices.270 Furthermore, in practice, an inquiry into an officer’s subjective
intent would likely be unfruitful. As the plurality argued, rarely will an officer
testify to a judge that the officer did his best to violate Miranda.271 More than likely,
the officer will swear that he never intended to violate Miranda, and this will give
him an opportunity to explain away the circumstances of the interrogation. In the
end, “deliberateness” would only be helpful if the state chose to shoot itself in the
foot by admitting that it tried to violate Miranda. In all other situations, the
266 See id. at 623-27.
267 See id. at 623-27.
268 See United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1141 (2004) (Berzon, J.,
dissenting in part).
269 See Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d at 1141;
270 See discussion supra II.D.5–6.
271 See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616 n.6 (plurality opinion).
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deliberateness inquiry would simply distract the court from evaluating the
circumstances of the interrogation. Even the Ninth Circuit, in Williams, found that
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence did not provide sufficient guidance for determining
“deliberateness,” forcing the court to rely upon the plurality’s five-factor test.272
A less controversial synthesis would incorporate Justice Kennedy’s “curative
measures” into the plurality test. For example, the plurality and Justice Kennedy
each place some weight upon the absence of an additional warning that a previously
made, unwarned statement may be inadmissible.273 This is essentially Judge
Azrack’s approach in Cohen.274 Judge Azrack applied the plurality’s five-factor test,
but he identified where Justice Kennedy’s curative measures fit into the factors.275
Nevertheless, before endorsing any synthesis, courts should acknowledge that it is
something on which the Justices themselves were unable to agree.
C. Courts Should Not Adopt Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence
The third possible option for lower courts deciding what test to apply to
question-first interrogations is to rely on Justice Kennedy’s test. Besides the
concerns expressed by the plurality and dissent in Seibert, it is worthwhile to
consider another defect in the subjective test: the burden of proof. One commentator
notes that Justice Kennedy’s “new bad faith test shifts an impossible and
inappropriate burden onto the defendant, who must now prove that a particular police
officer acted in bad faith.”276 This requirement “creates the risk that future pretrial
Miranda hearings will devolve into credibility battles focused on irrelevant and
unanswerable questions inevitably won by the men and women in blue.”277 Under
most circumstances, the state would be foolish to admit bad faith, so the defendant
will have to prove intent circumstantially. And even if the initial burden of proof
was manageable, Justice Kennedy’s test allows the state to redeem itself after the
fact by applying cheap “Band-Aides” in the form of curative measures, which could
be as simple as a fifth-warning.278
D. Courts Could Devise a New Test
272 See discussion, supra Part III.D.1.
273 See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616 & n.7, 622.
274 See Cohen, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 355-59.
275 See id.
276 Joëlle Anne Moreno, Faith-Based Miranda?: Why the New Missouri v. Seibert Police
“Bad Faith” Test is a Terrible Idea, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 395, 397-98 (2005).
277 Moreno, supra note 276, at 398 .
278 See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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The last option for courts deciding how to address question-first
interrogations is to devise an entirely new test. In this context, five sitting Justices
have already declared their positions. However, with Chief Justice John Roberts and
Associate Justice Samuel Alito joining the Court since Seibert was decided, the
Supreme Court’s Miranda jurisprudence should continue to evolve, and this could
allow lower courts to explore new solutions to question-first tactics.
VI. CONCLUSION
At the end of this Article, it is worthwhile to return to its beginning–to return
to Miranda. When Chief Justice Warren, in Miranda, recounted the historical
development of the privilege against self-incrimination, he observed that “[t]he
privilege was elevated to constitutional status and has always been ‘as broad as the
mischief against which it seeks to guard.’”279 Chief Justice Warren believed that the
Court was compelled to honor that principle: “We cannot depart from this noble
heritage.”280 Today’s courts are no less obligated to protect the constitutional rights
and privileges of its citizens, and the scope of those rights and privileges must
remain “as broad as the mischief against which [they] seek[] to guard.”281 Although
there has been much debate over the Seibert Justices’ positions, all nine Justices
acknowledged the potential for mischief caused by question-first interrogations.
On a normative level, a correct Marks analysis shows that Justice Kennedy’s
opinion in Seibert is not the narrowest grounds and is, therefore, not controlling. On
a positive level, courts should consider Miranda’s underlying policies in light of the
mischief caused by question-first tactics before selecting a governing standard.
One may argue that a particular defendant, such as Jayant Kadian, does not
“deserve” the rights and privileges which he or she is granted under the Constitution,
particularly when that privilege is given effect by courts. Nevertheless, the
Constitution does not govern only that defendant. The Constitution governs courts,
cops, citizens, and criminals, and that is why Chief Justice Warren’s statement is still
true today: “We cannot depart from this noble heritage.”
279 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 459-60 (1966).
280 Id. at 460.
281 Id. at 459-60.
